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ABaWkCT
fhi» ueleg mm it# fooal text 5t.Thom##
Agmi###' tr##t##mt in »m#k %I #f th# #mmm# Cmmtm# Gmmtilmm. 
is «» é'P^p&mmh to th# probiem of th# mnlmn of the int#ileii«' 
t##l #mh#t#m## with th# h#dy.
Th# problem# in #h##t, i# that th# proportion r#» 
qmirmd h#t*##n matter and form wotild apparently entail a 
determination, by th# matter of the body, of the soul'» 
reoeptioity of intelligible forma, to the detriwmmt of the 
qna#i*imfimite peteney of the intelleet. On the other hand, 
amyeme denying that th# intelleotnai eoel ia the form of the 
body muet explain hem the aetiem of nmderatanding ie attrihu- 
ted eeaentially to mam.
Am initial emamimetiem of the teaehing# of Arietotle 
eeree# to a##a#imt m# with the matmre of the eoml and the 
eemeegmemt diffiemltie# involved* The## diffieoltiea are 
hromght into atill eharper feem# in the phileeephy of 
Awerree# who, teaohimg that th# imtelleet i# eeperate hat 
in ammtimmatie with the body hy the intelligible epeoiee 
preaeat ie both the ietelleat am# tb# ecur-fwraal pHantama,
fail# to explain how the aetiem of onderetanding in predioa- 
ted e##emtially of mam.
Plato, who held that the aoni i# omited to the body
iii
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only a# mover to the moved fails in the sane respect, and, 
like Averroes, seems to fell into the error of saying that 
man is several beings.
St.Thomas offers a resolution of the problem in 
teaching that the subsistent soul, having vegetative,sen­
sitive and intellective powers, communicates its esse to 
the body which it needs, constitutes a substantial union 
with the body through one act of being, and yet surpasses 
the matter of the body in its intellective powers whose 
exercise needs no corporeal organs.
iv
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM
This thesis is primarily an exposition of the 
Thomistic doctrine concerning the soul's union with the body, 
giving insights into the nature of man.
That every sensible being is composed of prime matter 
and form, the two combining in a relationship of potency and 
act to produce a third, the composite, we know from cosmologi­
cal considerations presented in Aristotle's hylomorphic theory. 
It is neither the form nor the matter but the reality of the 
composite which exists and acts. Hence, it might appear that 
form would be determined according to the nature of the matter 
of which it is the act and perfection. It would seem then, 
that the two must be perfectly proportioned to one another, the 
form not exceeding the matter in which it has its being. 
Remaining on the cosmological level, and applying these prin­
ciples, one would conclude that the intellectual soul, the 
principle of understanding, could scarcely be the form of the 
body. For, having its being, power, and operation imbedded in 
matter, the soul's receptivity of intelligible forms in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 .
action of wndorotafiding would bo dot®rmined by the matter of 
the body, to the detriment of the qtteei-lnfinite potency of 
the intelleot. On the other hand, anyone denying that the 
intelleotnai «oui ie the form of the body, must explain how 
the action of understanding ia attributed essentially to man.
This thorn, in the side of philosophers from the time 
of flats, was extracted by @t.Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth 
century. That the problem has persisted, as is evidenced by 
the philosophies of such as Descartes, is due, perhaps, to a 
lack of true appreciation of the Thomietie doctrine. Such an 
appreciation cannot be had without considering the various 
treatments given the problem by philosophers prior to St. 
fhosaa. Kis reeolutien of the difficulty, though found in
the Sswto SàSSMSâM# Sfissteââ» the
Gousculmm 4m. Anima, is beet presented in the awe-inspiring 
complexity of the jaiM SMMSM Gentil## which we shall use as 
our focal text.
Our historical considerations of the philosophies of 
Mate, Aristotle, and Averroes will not follow chronological 
order. We will begin with that of Aristotle, for his teach­
ings serve to acquaint us with the nature of the soul and 
the consequent difficulties involved, These difficulties are 
them brought into sharper focus in the philosophy of Averroes, 
whose literal, and possibly erroneous, interpretation of 
Aristotle * s dictum that the intellect is "separable, both 
impassible and unmixed*, in the light of the quasi-infinite
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
potency of the possible intellect, led hi» to deny that the 
intellectual soul is the form of the body. Hence, he seeks 
to explain that the action of understanding is attributed to 
man because the separate intellect is In continuâtio with the 
man by the intelligible species being present in both the 
intellect and the corporeal phantasm.
Continuing, we shall briefly consider the doctrine of 
Plato on this matter. For St « Thomas' teachings are closer to 
those of Plato than to those of Averroes. The Angelic Doctor 
draws little, if anything, from the latter. Rather, he seems 
to find it to be a corruption of the teachings of Aristotle 
and contents himself in the Contra Gentiles, which he wrote 
primarily to refute the Arabian philosophers, with pointing 
out the absurdities which follow on it. Although Plato 
erred as greatly in attempting to show that man is said to 
understand because the immortal (intellectual) soul is united 
to him as mover to the moved, St.Thomas finds in this "contact 
of power'* a certain validity. For he notes that "the intellec­
tual substance can be united to a body by contact of power",^ 
and in a following chapter^ refutes arguments posited to show 
that a thing one in ratio would not be so constituted.
In the philosophies of Averroes and Plato, we find 
involved teachings, directly or indirectly, of the plurality
 ^Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles (Taurini: 
Marietti, 1938), bk.II, ch. 57.
 ^Ibid., ch.,69.
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of forms characteristic of most esmentialist philosophies. 
While one might be accused of prematurely crediting this 
erroneous position to these philosophers, as well as to 
Aristotle, certainly we can find in the philosophies of 
Averroes and Plato a similarity of attitude that the intel­
lectual soul transcends but does not transfuse the body.
On the other hand, St.Thomas, resolving the problem 
by the application of metaphysical and not merely cosmologi­
cal principles, teaches that the subsistent soul, having 
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective powers, communicates, 
in the order of formal causality, its esse to the body which 
it needs, constitutes a substantial union with the body 
through that one act of being, and yet surpasses the matter 
of the body in its intellective powers whose exercise need 
no corporeal organs* In the Thomietie system, the intel­
lectual soul as the form of the body transcends - but also
transfuses the body. As we shall see, the entire resolution
of this problem rests on the relation of matter surpassing 
intellection and matter-immersed sensation, a relationship 
wherein sensation is necessary for the acquisition of know­
ledge but does not, nevertheless, deprive the intellect of
its autonomy in the actual act of understanding.
In the Thomietie doctrine, man takes on a nobility
granted to him by no other philosophy, namely the dignity of
an intellectual being, a little less than the angel and so 
much more than the animal. In the Contpa Gentjles.
St.Thomas surprisingly begins his treatment of the problem
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with th* #h#pt#r entitled: "That the Ferfeetiee of the Uni*
J
veree Require# the B#iete#ee ef Bmm Intelleetuel Creeturee.*^ 
One would ml##et think that he i# epeekiug etrietly ef 
engele, however, in the next twenty-one oîwaptere, which in- 
elude hieterieel eoueideretien#, he preeeet# hi# re«olution 
ef the prohlo» end hi# haeie deetrine on the nature of man.
^ Ihiâ.* #h. ii.
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CHAPTER II
ARIRTOTlBrTME 80UL AS THE FORM OF THE BODll
Appiyifig th# eo#mol#gic#l principle» which he hae 
mxp&umémd in the fhxelee. Arietetle prove# in the following 
mamner that the eeul ie united to the body. After showing 
that the soul is one principle eeasmen to the several types of 
living thingsI he consider# the relation of the vegetative, 
sensitive, intelleotive, and loooeotive powers to each other 
and to the soul. Me proceeds to do this by asking two 
questions: (A) Is each of these powers a soul; (D) If each 
power is only a part, is it separable, only as being thought 
of as separate, or has it also a distinct place, as a separ­
ate being, in a part of the body. Giving consideration to 
the see^md question first, he notes that, with regard to sons 
powers, we quite easily see that they do have being in cer­
tain parts ef the body; ethers are not in any special part; 
and ether powers cause us sons doubt. This he illustrates 
by reference to plant life, noting that sows plants can be 
out, but continue to live when grafted or replanted; in 
which case the life principle appears to be one soul in act,
^ at. Aristotle, 1» the
version of William of Moerbeke...translated by Ken#In foster 
and Silvester Humphries (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1951), pp. 187 - 194 (in II de Anima, lec. 4).
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but several in potency,®
Ariatetle continues his illwstretion with reference 
to animais which can be cut in half, such as snakes and 
frogs, but centinns to react in withdrawing from the tactile 
stimulus of the pin; consequently, the part would seem to 
retain the principle of sensation and local movement, and 
also imagination which Aristotle defines as "a movement never 
originated apart from sensation,*^ Further, the divided part 
must also have appetitien as is evident frmi its comfort- 
seeking effort to avoid pain. Thus, the divided part con­
tains the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, and locomotive 
principles which are, then, not in any special part of the 
body. On the other hand, the external sense powers, with the 
exception of the most fundamental and necessary one of touch, 
are located in the special parts of the body, the sense organs* 
Finally, "but as regards intellect and speculative 
power, nothing has so far been demonstrated; but it would 
seem to be another kind ef soul, and alone capable of being
 ^St.Thomas, in his commentary, draws attention to the 
fact that the same thing is observable in the forms of inani­
mate physical bodies which can be divided into parts but 
retain the same nature, for example, rocks. ,££. St.Thomas
Aquinas, M  âgiüfctiâlii. jUAm» trans-
Imted by K«noim Foster and Silvester Husmphricei Aristc.tle.'.s 
be Anima. in the version of William of Moerbeke; with the 
commentary of St.Thomas Aquinas, (Londont Routlodge and 
Kogan Faul, 1951), P.191 (in II be Apjma. lec.4, No,264).
3 Aristotle, on. cit.... p.394. (Do Anima HI, 418 blS).
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separated, ma the eternal from the periahable."^ Cempleting 
hi# am ewer te the eecend queetien,. lie etatee, "By defltii- 
tien, however, they are ebvieuely diatlnet. Per if feeling 
is ether than ©pining, the eenee faculty will differ from 
the capacity te farm ©pinion». Likewise with each of the 
other powers mentioned,"  ^ Hence, these faculties and 
powers, excluding the intellect and the speculative power 
ef which no conclusion is here reached, are separable in 
thought, and some, such as the sense organs and their 
powers,are separable in place,
low he answers the first question posed, aa to 
whether each power la a soul or a part of the soul, noting 
that some animated beings have only one power, judging 
from the vital operations; others more than one; and yet 
others have all four. Where only one of these prineiples 
is found, as is the case with the lower forms of plant 
life, it is itself the soul; however, where more than one 
are found, as in the higher forms of life, the soul la 
named after the hig)wr part or power.
Aristotle proceeds to set forth, in four parts,
4 p . m .  (IbuWm# II, 413 b 16).
 ^Ibid.. pp.117-188. (De Anima II, 413 b 29).
^  at.Thomas Aquinas, p.191* (In II Dp Anima.
lee.4, no. 270).
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th# argument whereby he oenoludea that the soul is "an 
actuality and formal principle of a thing in potency to 
exist accordingly"^ or, in other words, is that by which we 
live, sense, move, and understand.
The major proposition is to the effect that if we 
concede that there are two principles of our being and 
activity, one will be prior to the other. This he explains 
observing that we can speak of the principle of life and 
sensation from two points of view, formally or materially, 
for example, when w# speak ef the act of knowing as proceed­
ing either from the knowledge itself or from the soul, or
when we speak of becoming healthy either with regard to the 
health itself or with regard to the body as becoming healthy, 
one of these principle» is formal and the other is material. 
As St.Thomas comment#*
for knowledge and health are forms or actualities of 
certain subjects* knowledge is a form & f %tm soul that 
knows; health of the body capable ef health. Thus, he
(Aristotle) says 'capable of knowing* and 'capable of
health' in order to indicate the particular subject's 
aptitude to its particular form. For the actuality 
of any active principle, such as the form transmitted 
to matter by an agent, always appears to exist in 
what receives it and is adapted to it, i.e. in the 
subject, whose nature is to receive from one particu­
lar active principle, and which is adapted to attain 
the final term of the receiving process, namely the
form in qweetioia» »
7 Aristotle, mUMâSf» p.lSf. (Be Anima II, 414 a 28).
i 8t.Themes Aquinas, p.193 (In H  Be Anima.
loo, 4, No. 272). The reader's attention is drawn to the
statement herein of the proportion required between matter 
and form.
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Slwâlarly, we #p#*k of there being two prineiples of 
life, the soul and the body. #e are said to live by the 
body only insofar as th# body has a soul, the aotttality of 
the body, Hsnos, the body is the material pritioiple of life 
and the soul is the formal prinoipl# of life. Th# soul 
then is prior to the body.
Th# analogy is made that as knowledge is a# a form 
and spooifio essemoe to the, soul knowing* as health is as 
a for# and spooifio osseno# to the body being healttqr, so 
the soul is to the body as a speoifie form. Being a 
spooifio form, the soul is mot a material for, or a mere 
subjeet of, anything.
To elinoh the argument, lest anyone say that the 
body, which is a principle of life, is the form no less than 
the soul, Aristotle motes that substance is predieated in 
three ways* as the form, as the matter, and am wtiat results 
as one from the coaqxisite of form and matter. %ith refer- 
once to the latter, the body is clearly net the soul's 
actuality, the soul being prior to the body as we have said 
above. hence, it is the soul and not the body which is the 
specifying principle, since it is clear that the body is 
mot the form of the soul.
Prom the foregoing Aristotle deduces that the soul 
is not a body, but is a part of the body, and therefore
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Il
"is in « b o d y * and in a body of a definite kind} sinco 
the act ia alwaya tbo act of that which i« in potency to it 
He Goncitidesi "that the eotil, then, ie an actuality and 
formal principle of a thing in potency to exiat accordingly 
io evident from theme oeneideratieno.*
However, it «mot tee remembered that at the beginning 
of hie diooouroo Ariatetle had maid, "but am regards intel­
lect and opeonlative power, nothing hae ec far been 
demonstrated; but it would ooem to be another kind of soul, 
and alone capable of being separated, as the eternal from 
the p e r i s h a b l e The reason for this controversial remark 
lies in the nature of the possible intellect, the exlstenoe 
of which he posited because "whenever a thing is found to be
sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, there must be
11some principle by which it is in potency," As man is sose- 
times actually sensing and sometimes only potentially, it is
necessary to maintain that in man there la a sentient 
principle which is in potency to sensible things. Similarly, 
it is meoessary to maintain that, since man is only some­
times actually understanding, in him there is an intellective
9 Aristetle, p.l$$. (De Anima II, A U  a 11).
I® St.Thomas demonstrates that the body of mam was given 
an apt disposition for the soul, yjdet St.Thomas Aquinas, 
gRM# T h m i W # #  (Ottawa* W m  g & W m m
ÊÈ&mlmmml#, wi-s), part %, q.9 1, a.i.
II St .Thomas Aquinas, &ggggglgm , translated by
John Patrick Rowan* The....Soul- (St.Louis* 8, Herder book Co., 
1949), eh.l, p.11.
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power which is in potency to intelligible things; this
12Aristotle sails the possible intellect,
If, then, there is but one formal principle in man, 
would mot the potentiality ef the possible intellect be 
determined by the matter ef the body, since it is neither the 
form nor the matter but the composite which exists and acts? 
And yet, if, to avoid this pregnable position, Aristotle 
meant his "intellect,,.would seem to be another kind of soul 
..." to be taken literally, would not this be tantamount to 
saying that there is not one but mere than one substantial 
form in a man? What, them, precisely is his doctrine? bet 
we now consider Averroes' answer to this question.
12 jZt. Aristotle, iawÜUê., P.4%5* (Do Anima III, 430 a 15)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAFTBR III 
AVBRR0E5 AND PLATO*
THE 8G0L mAN8CgNDBNT BUT NOT TRANSfUBINQ.
Literally imterpretleg Ariatetle'# diet»» that the
1
imtelleet ie "eepereble, both impaemihle and uneixed", 
Averree# propoeee hie «newer te that questiem by aaeertimg 
that it ie eeetrary to the mature ef the Imtelleetual soul 
to be the form of the body.
Averreee wee a follower of the position that the 
possible imtelleet, to be in peteney to « H  intelligible 
forma, must be devoid of every sensible mature, from which 
he Infers that the soul cannot be present in any body. ®
For Averroes, W m W m #  M  A W z  "#*** being 
totally estoraped by the matter of the body; in other words, 
he was of the opinion that there must be a ,i*e.r.fe.ct propor­
tion between matter and form by reason of coamologioal 
consideration#. Per, he defines matter as a substance which 
is in potency and form as a substance which perfects the
I Aristotle, Dm Amimhl (London,
1951), P.425. (Ill, 4ÏÔ a 17).
® Averroes,....................... .
edited by P. Stuart Crawford, (Ca«d»ridge, Mass.* Wediaeval 
Academy of America, 1953)» p.387» 1,15. (Cemmemtary on A&
m m . III. s).
13
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I
matter in potency to It.' the two are complementary to each 
ether ## that from their coming together a unity r e s u l t » , 4 
however, it ie a composite (unity) which "ie being in act 
only through the form",^  Thi# form cannot be the perfection
it i# except that it exist in the body^ as inseparable from
it.7
hence, he concluded that the intellect as the form of 
the body would, in sharing in the determinate nature of the 
body, have a determinate mature; consequently, it would not 
be capable of knowing all tilings.® This is so since it would 
seem that it would receive nothing without its matter; as
prime matter receives only individual forms, which are indiv­
iduated through being in matter, the possible intellect would 
receive forms as individuated and would not ttien be cognizant 
of universale. Similarly, as prime matter is not cognizant 
of the forms it receives, the possible intellect, having the
I I b M .. p.13b, 11.37*39. (Commentary on .Be..Anima. 11,2),
4 Ibid.. p.404, 1 1.503*594. (Commentary on ie .Anima, 11. 5).
® âàM* » p.139, 11.44*4 6. (Commentary on §«>.. ..^ nlpa. 11,7).
^ Ibid. ■« p.167, 11.16-17. (Commentary on Do Anima. 11,26).
 ^Ibid.. p.161, 11.44-4 6. (Commentary on Do Anima. 11,22).
® 8t.Thomas Aquinas, ffrfolomiae (Ottawa, 1941-5),
pdrt I, q»75, ». 2 c* "Si igitur principium intellectuale 
haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis non posset omnia 
corpora cognoscere."
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mmmm receptivity, would not b# cognisant of the forms 
reooivod. Again, as Aristotle provom,9 an infinite power
cannot exist in a finite body. However, the possible intel­
lect ie endowed with a eertain infinite power, since by it
we know universal# which are potentially infinite in number.
10
For these reasons, Averroes denied that the 
possible intellect cam be united to the body as it« form. 
However, this left him in the dilemma that follows from this 
positiem* that understanding ia not attributed to this parti­
cular man but rather to am Intellect separate from him. In 
order to avoid this incongruity, he taught that the possible
intellect "entirely separated from the body in its aetual
11being, is connected with 'this man' through phantasma." * 
This is so in that the intelligible species, which ia the 
perfection of the possible intellect, is founded in the 
phantasms from which it is abstracted. Hence, it hae a two­
fold kind of aetual being: one in the possible intellect,
and the other in the phantasm from which it la abstracted.
The phantasms are in 'this mam' because the imagination ia
a
Aristotle, .ghvsies. translated by R. P. Hardie and 
R. K. Gays. In# ,m#gi# W k #  , edited by
Richard McKeon, p p . til - 3#7 (New York# Randms House 
e. 1941), VIII, 166 m 25 mg.
'££• Averroes, oB...eit. « pp. 387-388» 11. 27-37.
(Commentary on .Is..Anima. Ill, 5).
II St.Thomas Aquinas, » trans­
lated by Nary C. fitapstrick* Dm Bniritual Creatures (Milwau­
kee: Marquette University Fress, 1949), p. 34. Averroes,
eB-..,ftit.. pp. 464-405, 11, f00-527. (Commentary on Pe Anima 
III, S). Rets that "connected" translates eentinuatie.
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a power within « body; that ia, it has a corporeal organ* 
Thus there ariae» one thing from the possible Intellect and 
the form undereteed in set. The possible intellect is then 
united to the form, which form ie else in union with the 
phentaem which i* in man. In this way, Averroes explains 
that it is the particular man who understands.
Th# possible intellect met being the form of man, 
Averroes sought to show that man differs specifically from
12
the brutes by the intellect which Aristetle call®"passive", 
and which is the same as the cogitative power that is proper 
to man. To this he credits the functions of distinguishing 
and comparing individual intentions and preparing, together 
with the imagination and memory, the phantasms to receive
the sotien of the agent intellect, whereby the phantasms are
11made intelligible in act. Accordingly, to this power he 
gives the name of 'intellect' or reason.
Thus, in the Averroeist system, man, composed of 
matter and a form which is immersed in matter, is united by 
eontinuatio to the intellectual soul (separate intellect) by 
the intelligible species present in both the intellect know­
ing and in the corporeal phantasm present in man. (We will
I' aC' Aristotle, Rp M
^.ondon, 1951), pp.425-416. (Ill, 436 a 27); Averroes,
p.454, 11.175*181. (Commentary on De Anima III, 20),
I® Averroes, nn^cit.. p.449, 11. 175*181. (Commentary on 
jWlmm 111, 26).
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consider later, in our treatment of St.Thomae, the question 
ef the validity ef this poeition.) The intelleotual soul, 
then, in the doctrine of Averroes, transcends, being separate, 
but dees not transfuse the body since it is not the form of
the body.
Plate's philosophy is very similar, for reasons simi­
lar to these which later led Averroes to refuse to accept the 
intellectual soul as the form of the body, Plato held that 
the soul is a self-m&bsistent and incorruptible form,^^ and 
consequently denied that the intellectual substance could 
inform the body. Per him, the body would sees to be also an 
actually existing subject, but different in genus since it is 
corruptible.
Like Averroes, Plato had to explain how the action of
understanding is said to belong to the particular man.^^ Of
16
the three ways an action may be attributed, Plato asserted 
that man is said to understand in virtue of his whole self.
Per he said that the soul, constituting the full perfection
SC* Plate, SMMÉA* »o«* 17*88» where Plate speaks of 
the soul as being self-restcrimg, self-reproducing, and 
immortal, perpetually rmaewing itself from within. Vide* 
fhamdeus. nos. 245*246. (All Plate references are to* The 
Dialogues.of Plate, translated by Denjamln Jewett, (New York* 
Random house, 1937), and to the marginal numbers in this 
translation),
P*15.
Aristetle, EhZgjgg, MaMJt*» V, 224 « 31.
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of the specie», is united to the body, not as its form, but
17 18only as mover to the movable, the body being the vehicle
and imagel^ of the soul. Thus he explains that the action of
understanding is attributed to the particular man inasmuch as
the man is the soul - "for surely there ie nothing which may
20be called more properly ourselves than the soul**.
To account for the fact that the body lives and has
the character of its own species, which it could not have by
reason of the immortal soul, as the mover causes the motion
21
and not the being of the moved, Plato stated that the form
22
of the body is a soul which is imprisoned in the body.
Judging from the way in which he described this soul, he seems 
to be referring to what we would call the sensitive soul.
17
PlAto, Phaedrus. no. 245. M M  I, no.892.
I® Plato, îiSâSMS, no. 69- 
Plato, Laws XII, no, 959.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Be Sniritualibu» Creaturis. trans­
lated by Mary C. Fitzpatricks On Sniritua1 Creatures (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1949), ch.2, pp. 35, 36. Cf.
PiAto, AlgibWme «<». no»
21 St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Taurini; 
Marietti, 1938), bk, II, ch. 57.
Plato, PhaedQ. no. 82.
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In #umm*ry, fch®«« prineipl®» of wmdormtamding, the 
Separate latelloot of Avorroo# mod the immortal ®o«l of Plato, 
are trammooodemt of the matter of the body, îhie muet be eo 
by reamom of the apparent determination of form by matter. For 
both philomopherm, the intellectual principle e*l«t« in almoet 
total eeparation from the matter of the body. Only the quaei-
nnionm of the »«d the  ftLMg
movmr-moeed relationmhio earn be admitted into their emmential- 
imm. Sttch a union doom not permit it to be maid that the 
intellectual principle tranmfumem the body, for such trans­
fusing can be maid only of that principle which enjoys that 
intimacy of being the form of the body. For the intellectual 
principle, am the form of the body, would be determined by 
the matter of the body. Consequently, they posited a material 
or matter-immermed principle a# the form of the body to 
account for the fact that the body lives and bam the character 
of its own species. Hence, it is the ‘passive intellect* in 
the Averroimt mymtem and the "soul of another nature which was 
mortal** Iti the Platonic system which transfuses the body as 
its form, The importance of this observation, nammly of the 
soul or intellectual principle transcending but not trans­
fusing, will bocom» more ®-vid®»fc in the light »f the Thonistlo 
solution of the problem. For, therein we will find that, 
despite the problem of determination, the intellectual soul 
not only transcends but transfuses the matter of the body 
being the form of the body.
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S*. TWONAa# TM& 80U& TKANaCBABR** A*B TKAW&PVai**
A. That the Soul Cem Be United to, 
and laterally Require# the Body
A# we have #eem, a literal interpretation of 
Aristotle's dictum that the intellect is ”separable, both 
impassible and ummixed" meat result in the doctrine that the 
intellectual soul, imasmueh as it transcends the body, can­
not transfuse the body as its form.
however, 8t.Thomas objects to such an interpretation 
of Aristotle and concludes that the Philosopher's doctrine 
is "where several (i.e. of the vegetative etc. principles) 
are found together each is a part of the soul and the soul 
itself is named after the principal part whether sensitive 
or intellectual as the case may be."* Me finds it hard to 
believe that Aristotle held that the intellect is a sub­
stance separated from the body because anyone who states 
that the intellect is a separate substance "implies that he 
himself understands nothing; and therefore then one need 
pay no attention to what he says, for it is clear that the
* St .Thomas Aquinas,
Gomppntapium. translated by Kenelm Foster and Silvester 
Mumphries* Aristo.felels._..,Be._.AMma,. in the version of William 
of Moerbekei with the cosmemtary of St.Thomas Aquinas,
(London* Rentledge and Kegan Paul, 19S1), p.192. (I n .11 do
Amina, lee. 4, no. 279).
20
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2
actually intelligent being is this particular man,"
A further argument may be adduced to show that 
Aristotle thought that there was one formal principle, one 
soul in an animal, the principle of all its activities. For, 
he himself says "one of the kinds of things that are is 
substance. Of this, there is one element, matter, which of 
itself, is no particular thing; another the form or species
according to which it is called this particular thing; and
4
3
a third, that which is both. From the De Anima, it is
evident that he regards the soul as the form of the body. 
Mow, since he says that form is that "by which it is called 
a particular thing", it is difficult to envision him as 
holding that one thing could be several (particular things). 
Such would be the ease if he held that the intellect was 
another kind of soul since, in essential attribution, man is 
said to sense (by reason of the sensitive soul) as well as 
to understand (by reason of the intellective soul). In 
other words, if both actions are attributed to man as opera­
tions flowing from his essence, them one must credit to that 
man the principles of those actions; hence one would credit 
to that man the sensitive and intellective souls as separate 
formal principles or forms by which he would then become two
2 Ibid.. p. 408. (In III de Anima, lec. 7, no.690.).
3 Aristotle, De Animai Aristotle's De Anima (London, 
1951), p. 163. (Ill, 412 a 6-10).
4 Ibid., p. 163. (Do Anima II, 412 a 20).
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"particular things**. The remaining alternative wowld he that 
man i* an aeeidental union (which Aristotle definitely doe# 
not hold). The haeis for eueh a oonoluaion lie# in the fact 
that whatever aeerwea to a thing after it# first substantial 
fore will accrue to it accidentally. Hence, if man's form 
is said to be the intellective soul, the nutritive and sensi­
tive souls will accrue to him accidentally.
Hence St.Thomas finds it hard to believe that, when 
Aristotle says that the intellect "would seem to he another 
kind of soul, and alone capable of being separated",  ^in 
which teat be (Aristotle) reaches no conclusion leaving it 
for later consideration, be meant that the intellect jj| 
another kind of soul. For, such an interpretation is bound 
to lead to the teaching of that illogical doctrine of the 
"plurality of forms" found in the philosophies of both Plato 
and Averroes. 8t,Thomas finds it equally difficult to 
believe that Aristotle held that the intellective soul is a 
substance separated from the body. Rather, Aristotle was 
probably referring to the intellect's independence of the 
body since it needs no corporeal organ for its action of 
understanding.^
St.Thomae point# out the error of such «n interprets- 
tiom of Aristotle's controversial statement by a critical
* j&id', p. 187. (Do Anima II, 413 b 24).
* Ikld', p. 450 sq. (Be Anima III, 4%9 a 10 sq.).
7 St.Thomas Aquinas, o p .cit.. p. 452. (In I,Il....d,e..ApAm.a.
lec. 12, no. 786).
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analysis of the philosophical psychologies of Plato and 
Averroes who, as we have seen, deemed such an interpretation 
necessary. Averroes taught that the possible Intellect is 
united to 'this man' because of the two-fold existence of 
the intelligible species, namely as united to the intellect 
in act and united to the phantasm from which it is abstracted. 
Further, he has asserted that man derives his specific nature, 
not from the possible, but from the passive intellect. How­
ever, this doctrine is unreasonable, A thing is capable of 
knowing, not because of the presence of the intelligible 
species, but because of its cognitive power. For Averroes, 
man is capable of knowing because the Intelligible species is
present to man, but the power of understanding, i.e. the pos-
8
sible intellect, exists in complete separation from him.
What actually follows, St.Thomas notes, is that the particu­
lar man is understood. For, the actually understood species 
is the form of the intellect, just as the actually visible 
species is the form of the power of sight. "As the species 
of color are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in 
the possible I n t e l l e c t , In other words:
O
££* St.Thomas Aquinas, Qpusculum de Anima, translated 
by John Patrick Rowan: The Soul (St«Louis: B. Herder Book 
Co., 1949), ch. 2, p.24.
^ St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. The Summa Theo­
logies of St.Thomas Aquinas, translated by The Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, 3rd ed.( London: Burns, Oates and 
Washbourne Ltd., 1938). Direct translations in text and notes 
are taken from this source, unless otherwise indicated.
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uthe intelligible epeeiee abstracted from the phantasm 
is in the possible intellect in the same way as the 
species 'color* is in the sense of sight. Mow the 
intelligible spoeiem is in the phantasm.% in the same 
way as a epeeies which makes seeing possible («necies 
vimibilie) is i* the physical object which is a wall.
New owing to the fact that the epeeies which makes 
seeing peseihle, the form 'sight' is based on the 
color of the wall, the act of seeing is not connected 
with the wall as with a seeing object, but as with a 
seen object, for by means of it the wall dees not see 
but is seen.19
Continuing the comparison we must conclude that the unavoid­
able consequence of this is that man ig understood, not that 
he understands.
In further criticism, eve#y kncwer la united to its 
object by its cognitive power, as the agent la united to the 
patient by the agent's operative power. It is by his intel­
lect as by his cognitive power that man is intelligent and 
hence united to the intelligible. This is in sharp contrast 
to Averroes* conclusion that mam is united to the intellect 
by the intelligible form.
Averroes* position might be sound if the intellect 
in potentiality and the intelligible in potentiality were 
one. But this is not the case, for, while it is true that
11
"the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one"
12"just as the sense in act and the sensible in act" arc one,
at.Thomas Aquinas, M„ jWÜCi&WmüklUI Ç,EM3mdL&» trana-
Isted by Mary C. Fitspatrick# On ioiritMsl Grostsree.
(Milwaukee* Marquette University Press, 1949), ch.2,pp.34-35.
"  ££• Arimtotl., a w d i . , p. 431. (B. Anl». Ill, 430 *3).
“  ££. Ifeââ-. P-3S8. (fia_toiB8 11. 433 b 37).
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the Intellect in potentiality end the intelligible in peten- 
tielity ere net one. The species of the thing a@ preeent 
in the phamt### ie only potentially intelligible; as present 
in the intellect, it ie actually intelligible, having been 
made eo by being abstracted from the phantasm by the light of 
the agent intellect. Therefore, the intelligible species 
could not be the means whereby a separate possible intellect 
could be brought into contact with man, because, in the 
separate possible intellect, the species of the thing would 
be fctuallv intelligible but not in contact with us; in the 
phantasm, the species would be only potentially intelligible, 
and therefore not in contact with the i n t e l l e c t .
His position is further criticised in that he was 
actually saying that the union of the possible intellect with 
man, following upon the operation of man, gives mam his 
species, namely of being intellectual; for, it takes place by 
means of the imagination, which Aristotle defines as "a move­
ment resulting from the exercise of a sense pcwer"*^ since it
1 A
is "a movement never originated apart from sensation." How­
ever, that which follows the operation of a thing does not
** St.Thomas Aquinas, Êumma Contra Gontilos (Taurini, 
1938), bk.Il, ch. 59.
Uiisl-
££. Ari.totl., . p. 395. (n . Anl.« III, 429 a 2)
m W . ,  p. 394. (Ba Aoliwt III, 428 b 15).
57357
m m m  wi'JEffiiTY u m m v
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give a thing it® spool*#, for the «peoific thing smst exist 
prior to th« operation. Mono*, Averroes mistakenly denies 
that man has intellect (formally speaking), and is forced to 
distinguish him from brutes by something else, which would 
seem to be that man is capable of being in continuation with
17the separate intellect, whereas the brute animal is not.
Perhaps to meet such an objection, Averroes sought 
to show that man differs in species from the brutes by the 
intellect which Aristotle calls 'passive*, This position is
answered in several ways by St.Thomas;  ^ it will suffice for
18cur purpose to note only one. The operations of a living 
thing are compared to the soul as second acts to the first 
act, which precedes the second in time in the same thing, 
just as knowledge precedes reflection. Row man has an opera­
tion, namely of understanding, higher than that of the 
animals. Therefore we must attribute to man a principle that 
gives him his proper specific nature, and which is related to 
the act of understanding as first to second act. Further, 
since the soul is independent of the body, needing no corpor­
eal organ, this principle cannot be immersed in matter. The 
'passive' intellect, which is dependent on the aenae organs, 
could not be such a principle.
17 St.Thomas Aquinas, $umm# .Contra. Gentiles. Ml S H * #
bk.%1, ch. 59.
ib&d., bk.II, ch. 60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
Let Its recall that Plato taught that the soul»
constituting the full perfection of the epeeies » is united to
the body sot as fore but only as the mover to the mmved. The 
body lives and has the character of its own species by reason
of a mortal soul of another mature, We have noted the simila­
rity of this to Averroes' union of the separate intellect to 
mam who derives bis species from a mortal, matter-immersed 
form, the 'passive* intellect. Since sensation is predicated 
essentially as well as understanding, to both philosophers 
may be credited the doctrine of a plurality of forms, a doc­
trine which at.Thomas attacks strongly in the Summa Gontra 
6entilss**speeifically citing Plato. They would seem to be 
reduced to the absurdity of saying either that man is three 
beings by reason of the nutritive, sensitive and intellective 
souls, or mao Jji by reason of one of the three, and the 
remaining two will accrue to him accidentally, thereby consti­
tuting man as an accidental being, for every substantial 
form makes a being complete in the genua of substance, the 
form being the actuality of the matter and that by which a 
thing is what it ie.
20
We have referred to the fact that an action may be 
said to belong to a thing in three ways. The first Is 
attribution through an accidental quality, which is impossible 
as far as the action of understanding is concerned, since this
** ibid., bk. II, ch. 58.
** aaacA, p* 17.
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would mean that mam is am accidental union* Further, we
have seen that Plato'# choice of the second alternative,
namely that understanding be said to belong to man in virtue
of his whole self me though he were but a soul, is really
the same as the first alternative. Hemes St.Thom»» held to
the third way, namely that mam underatand» in virtue of the
21intellectual principle which is a part of him so that it is 
united to him, and, simoe the action of understanding is 
predicated of mam essentially, the principle of this action 
must be united to him as bis substantial form.
If the possible intellect were a separate substance
and united in any other way,
it would be impossible for a mam to understand by mean* 
of it, because if a substance performs am operation, 
that operation cannot belong to any other substance 
than the one performing it. for, although one of two 
substances can be the cause of the other's operation, 
as the principal agent is the cause of the activity of 
the instrument, nevertheless the action of the prin­
cipal agent is mot numerically the same as that of the 
instrument, for the action of the agent consists in 
moving the instrument, whereas that of the instrument 
consists in being mmvod by the agent and in moving 
something else. Consequently, if the possible intel­
lect is a substance existing apart from this or that 
particular mam (as Averroes held) it is impossible for 
the possible intellect's act of intellection to bo the 
act of any particular man*»
hence he concludes that "there remains no other 
explanation than that given by ârietotle - namely, that this
** at.Thomas Aquinas, @90#^ Th#*%9*A8#, a&sÊlk', 
part I, q. 7©» a. 1 c.
** St. Thomas Aquinas, ()iwuuscul::m dbm AundLawi. ed. cit.. 
ch, 2, p* 33,
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particular man understands because the intellectual prin­
ciple is his form", the possible intellect being "a certain
faculty or power of the soul."^^
How this could be was the problem which confronted 
the Angelic Doctor in the thirteenth century. On the one 
hand, we have the nobility of the soul in its substantiality 
and immortality ; on the other hand , we have the unity of 
man to be insured. To posit the soul as the form of the 
body would seem to endanger either one or the other. If the 
soul is a complete substance, a composite, it could not 
enter into a further composition in an essential way; thus 
the human compound would be rendered an accidental unity. On 
the other hand, if we make the soul simple, in order to 
safeguard the unity of man, it would be Immersed in matter
as a material form. To unite these two extremes is the task
he undertakes in the pontpa....Gentiles.
St.Thomas begins by establishing that, since intel­
lectual substance® are analogous to their Creator's nature, 
operation and mode of operation in their intellect and will, 
the existence of these intellectual substances is fitting
24
for the perfection of the universe. After then establish­
ing that the intellectual substance has will and freedom of 
choice in acting, he proceeds to show that the intellectual
Ibid.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit., 
bk. II, ch. 4 6.
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substance is not a body, nor a material form, and is immat­
erial. This he does arguing from the immaterial power of
25
understanding possessed by such a substance.
The argument is well paraphrased by Dr. Pegis, who
says:
the forms of things are not really intelligible un­
less separated from their matter by the power of the 
intellect in the act of knowing and at the moment 
when they are received in the intellect. The intel­
lect must therefore be free from matter in the sense 
that neither is a part of it matter nor is it im­
pressed in matter as are the material forms. In 
other words, we can admit niether the composition of 
matter and form in the soul nor the existence of the 
soul in the body as a material form. 26
However, if there is no composition of matter and 
form, what composition can be admitted in the intellectual 
substance? In a philosophy such as Aristotle's, wherein 
form is the highest act, an insurmountable difficulty is 
confronted here.
In the Thomistio doctrine, wherein recognition is 
given to the act of existing (egse). metaphysics supplies
the answer, For in God alone is esse (quo est) and essence
27(quod est) the same. In all other substances, inasmuch as 
their existence is had not of themselves but from another,
25 j&id., Ohs. 47, 48
Anton C. Pegis, St.Thomas and the Soul (Toronto: 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1934), PP« 133-134.
^7 St,Thomas Aquinas, iSumqa T h e o l o g i a e. ed.cit., part I, 
q.3, a.4} Summa Gontra Gentile*.. pAj-rIA. , bk. I, ch. 22.
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'being* and ’what is* differ. Hence, in the created intel­
lectual substance there is a composition of forma and esse
or ammâ safe *©9 msumk*
Since that which belongs to a thing through itself 
is always necessarily in it and inseparable from it, intel­
lectual substances can never be deprived of being, for they
are themselves forms and ’being* is consequent upon form
29through itself. The importance of this point will be seen 
shortly,
How, in order for it to be the substantial form of
30
the body, the intellectual soul must meet two requirements. 
First, it must be the formal principle of the substantial 
being of the thing whose form it is. Secondly, the form and 
the matter must be joined together in the unity of one act 
of being. As to the first condition, it is to be noted that 
the soul is said to be the formal, and not the productive, 
principle whereby a thing exists and is called a being. This 
is a distinction which could not be made in the essentialist 
philosophy of Plato who, like Aristotle and many others, 
failed to attach any significance to the act of ’esse *j con­
sequently, Plato, for one. Identified the orders of efficient
28 Ibid.. ch. 52Î St.Thomas Aquinas, Le **De Ente et Essen­
tia" (Paris* Librairie Philosophique, J, Vrin, 1948), ch. 4
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit.. 
bk. II, ch. 55.
30 Ibid.. ch. 68.
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and formal causality.** If the soul were united to the body 
#s Its efficient eaume, a thing one in being would not result; 
hence, the second condition would net be fulfilled. Mow "it 
is obvious that the soul is the reality which gives life to 
the body. Moreover, vital activity Cyivere) Is the act of 
existing of living things.^* Consequently the soul is
that which gives the body Its act of existing."33
It oust be resesbered, however, that the single act of 
being does not belong in the same way to the matter as to the 
intellectual substance. "For that act of being appertains to 
the corporeal matter as its recipient and its subject raised 
to a higher level; it belongs to the intellectual substance 
as to its principle, and in keeping with its very own nature."34 
Thus is answered the objection that the soul, being of the 
genus of the incorporeal, could not communicate its being to 
corporeal matter, for, together in the one act of existing, 
they are of one and the same genus as principles of it; if 
they existed apart, the intellectual substance and the body
31 Sf. Btienne Gilson, #8* ÜHaMMK ,
2nd ed., (Toronto* Garden City Frees Co-operative; 1952)» 
ch. S.
3* Aristotle, p. 111. (R* II,
415 b 13). "In all things that live, to live is to bo."
33 @t.Thomas Aquinas,
oh* Up fi* 9#
34 8t.Thomas Aquinas, ##00* GTm&KAGmatl&T*, #4,Æit', 
bk. 11, oh. **.
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would b# #p#ci#e of diverse genera.
35
Disregarding for the moment the problem of receptivity, 
it i# evident, from the foregoing, that, communicating it# 
own being to the body, the intellectual eubetamce can be
united to the body aa it# eubetantial form, constituting a 
substantial unity, the two existing by the soul's one act of 
being.
Thus, cam we contemplate that "actively engaged in It,
the soul is giving itself the body which it needs; it
progressively builds it up through physiological operations
which pave the way for intellectual operations."** For it is
of the soul's very nature to be united to the body "not as a
thing having a complete species of its own, but as completing
37the human species by being the form of the body";^' a sub­
stantial perfection evidenced by the fact that "when the soul 
leaves the body, the body's individual parts retain their 
original names only in an equivocal sense."**
further the soul is united to the body for am accident­
al perfection, for "inasmuch as the soul is naturally capable
of acquiring immaterial knowledge from material things,
** Sunra. pp. 14 - 15.
** Gilson, a m  , p. 186.
*7 at.Thomas Aquinas, Onusculum de.Amim#.  Mi*
ch. 1, p. 10.
’* ISiâ., p. 9.
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evidently it# epeeiee eea be complete only when it ie united 
to a body; "for » thing's epeeies is complete only if it has 
the things necessary for the proper operation of it# 
epeeies,"** "The soul united to the body cam understand only 
by turning to the phantasms, as experience s h o w s . "40 These 
phantasms, from which the intelligible species Is abstracted
by the agent intellect, actualieing the possible intellect,4*
41
though intermittently, are dependent upon the sense organs 
of the body, hence it is for its own good that the soul, 
understanding "by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are 
in corporeal o r g a n s , "43 i# united to the body which it needs.
Since Plato maintained that the participation of forms 
by material things is for the sake of material things, he 
could of course see no reason why the subsistent form, the 
human soul, should be united to the body; in keeping with 
his belief, if the soul were united to the body, it would be
** p. li; if* St.Thomas Aquinas, .In Aristotclis
à ià rm J& I » M ts iâ * »  p .429 , (laJüÜ Ldm
Aalaa, i#** 1*, **» 734).
4® St.Thomas Aquinas, &uama.._TMol@gime. #d..cit.. Part I, 
q. #9, a 1 c.| af. St.Thomas Aquinas, In. A.rimtotmlis librum
p* 409.
lec. 7, no. 69I),
42 gg.Thomas Aquinas, SEsJEif*» P* 40*. (In 111 de Anima, 
lec, 7, no. 6f2).
A M . ,  p. 413. i*©* », »©«* 7oo, 701)
61* St.Thomas Aquinas, JEtoft> ââaSiâ*» oh, IS,
p. *03.
43 St.Thomas Aqmin»#, Psmm part 1
q. *9, a. 1 c.
»
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imprisoned and entombed by the human body. To the contrary, 
as Aristotle had seen, matter exists for the sake of form, 
the human body for the sake of the seul. Thus the human 
body is considered as having been given am apt disposition 
for the soul.44 Since"the proximate end of the human body 
is the rational soul and its operations”,4* we cam contemp­
late the unity of the composite from the point of view of 
final causality by attending to the end of the intellectual 
being, man, namely Truth.
One might question, in view of the soul's immortality 
and need for the phantasms, whether the soul separated from 
the body cam understand anything. This St.Thomas answers 
noting that the soul "when united to the body, consistently 
with that mods of existence, has a mode of understanding by 
turning to corporeal phantasms which are in corporeal 
organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a 
mode of understanding by turning to simply intelligible 
objects, as is proper to other separate substances”,4* re­
taining its proper being when separated from the body. 47
44 Ibid.. q, 91, ». 3» n.b., the replies to objections. 
(f.St.Thomas Aquinas, RgmMMlk* d # . . W # , ©h. 8,
pp. 100 - 101.
4* St,Thomas Aquinas, ed.cit.. part I,
q. 91, a. 3 c.
"  Ikid'» q. 89. ». 1 c.
47 iâîM*# d* 76, a. 1 gjj 6
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icw cm® mrgw# that God should havs ordorsd the
soul's mmtur# so that it would hsvo hooa ustursl for it to
uudorstaad is the sohlar way, sasmly hy turmisg to simply
istalligihls ohjsots for which it would sot hsvs s«sds4 ths
body, Wowsvor, "if ths imfsrior substsmoss [hmmn
roooivsd spsoiss Is ths asms dogrss of usivsrsslity as ths
superior suhstasoss Issgsls], siso# they ars sot so strong
is umdsrstsnding, ths hssmlodgs whish thoy would dsrivs
through ths# would ho impsrfoot, asd of gsnsrai and oomfussd
nature . , . . Therefore to make it possible for human souls
to possess porfsot asd proper hsswledgs, they were so made
that their sature required them to he Joined to bodies, and
thus to reoeive the proper asd adequate knowledge of sensible
things from ths sensible things themselves."4*
Is short "the human soul is united to the body both
for a good mhish is a substantial perfeotism; and for a good
whieh is an sssidestal perfsotima, namely, the perfeotin# of
the soul in imtellsotual ksewledge whieh it aequires from
the sensesI for this mode of understanding is natural to 
itmam," Having its own esse, the soul oan exist apart from
the body and understand by turning to simply intelligible
48 a# i s.
49 at .Thomas Aquinas, RmWNhlm# 6# W * # »  «uuaa »
oh. 1, g|| 7# p« 13,
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objects^but bam am aptitude and a natural inclination to be 
united to the body which it need® and give# itmelf, communi­
cating it* own being Cemme) to the body; together they 
constitute a unity of being,
B, The Soul Excecdc the Proportion of Matter
From what ham them far been maid, it ie apparent that 
the ooul exceed* the human body in it# being and operation, 
and that, contrary to Avorroaa' euppomltion, a perfect pro­
portion ia not required between matter and form. Aa under­
standing Im a vital activity belonging essentially to man, 
its principle meat be the soul, the principle of life. Am 
operation follows on being, the human aoul'a mode of eximt- 
ing cam be known from it# operation, The activity of 
understanding im not offacted by mean# of the body. This 
operation haa no bodily organ, but ia an operation tranaceii- 
dina the material order, "hence the actual being of that 
principle (i.e. of umderatanding, namely the soul), must be 
an actual being which ia raiapd. abpv# corporeal matter and 
not dependent on it",*® mince, "inasmuch am the human soul 
haa an operation tranaconding the material order, its act of 
existing transcends the body and does not depend on the 
body."** Hence, "though the form and matter are united in
St.Thomas Aquinas, 'SâifiiS*»
ch, Sc,, p. 34,
51 St.Thomaa Aquinas, Qcnsewlum dm Anima. gaWuLt', ©h, 1,
p. 11.
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the one act of boiog, the matter mood not alway# foe commonau-
rat® with the form. Indeed the higher the form the more it
S3murpaoeoo matter in it® being."
fhie ia made evident by examining the order of forms 
through the observation of their operation#, sinoe each 
thing aota according aa it haa being,
Row the lowest of theme, namely those of inanimate 
bodies, are wholly immersed in matter, aa is evidenced by the 
fact that they have no operation# of their own. Sometimes, 
we are perhaps tempted to attribute operations to then, but 
these are actually "limited to the class of those proper to 
the qualities such as heat, cold, moisture and dryness, 
rarity and density, gravity and levity, etc."**
With a view to the continuity of nature, St,Thomas 
stated that higher than these forms are the formm of mixed 
bodies which lie somewhat midway between the forms of the 
simple elements which we have first mentioned and the higher 
forma, namely those of animate beings,*4i# this he cites aa
** St.Thomas Aquinas, %!### mAagii*,
bk.II, oh, 6i| nf. St.Thomas Aquinas, * The
Summa Theologies of St.Thomas Aquinas, translated by the 
fathers of the Sngliah Dominican Province. 3rd ed. ^London: 
burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 193»), part I, q. 76, 
a. 1 c., vol. 1, p. 27, "the nobler a form ia, the more it 
rises above matter, the leas it ia iswerged in matter, and 
the more it excels matter by its power and its operation."
** St,Thomas Aquinas, Summa^ Contra_GentjLjea. sâiSiS*» 
bk. II, ch, 68.
^4 jMA'
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## example the ledeetome who*# epermtiom ef attraction he 
credit# to a power received from, and eoneequent upon, the 
epeclce of the heavenly hcdlee. This mac not a philosophical 
error on bis part, but a result of the fact that his scienti­
fic knowledge of the nature of magnetic forces was deficient. 
What he took to be something different is, in fact, but 
another disposition of matter.
However, a continuity is seen in the microscopic 
organisms of plant life. For the forms of such plants, and 
for that matter all plants, are the intrinsic principles by 
which the plant lives and haa self-movement aa evidenced by 
the opérations of nutrition, growth, and generation. Hence 
these forms have a greater nobility them the forms of inani­
mate beings which have no operations of their own.
In this lower order of vitality there seems to be 
greater and lessor perfection of life: the almost inanimate
microscopic organisms, the diminutive duckweed, the poppy 
whose shoots bend and bow to the different points of the 
compass and follow the path of the awn on its senith, the 
sver-aproading prickly pear of India, the purslane and chick- 
weed whose seeds continue to ripen oven when the plant is 
uprooted, plants which revive year after year. Some bear 
marked ressmhlanco to animal life: the pea whose tendril 
moves apparently in circular avoidance of the touch of the 
twig, the Desmoduam of the Ganges Basin whose leaves are in 
constant motion, the Venus flytrap of ths Caroline swamps,
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and the insect-eating sundew. The operations, flowing from 
these forms, are through, and for, the matter of the composite; 
as such, they fail to surpass the proportion of matter.
Bearing in mind St.Thomas' dictum that "it is always
found that the lowest in the higher genus touches the highest
55of the lower species", we note that the transition from 
plant life to animal life is aa gradual as that from inanimate 
beings to living plants. Among the lowest of the animals we 
find the plant-like sponges, sohphytes, corals, the sluggish 
sea squirt, the single-celled amoeba, and the edentates of 
more active vitality. But they are the forms of the brute 
animals which "resemble the higher substances not only in 
moving, but even, somehow, in knowing, so that they are capable 
of operations to which the aforesaid qualities (dispositions of 
matter) are of no assistance even organically, although these 
operations are performed only by means of a bodily organ."
Modern physiology and experimental psychology have 
contributed to explaining the "somehow" of St.Thomas' statement 
and have also banished the misconception, scientific not philo­
sophic, that the qualities which are dispositions of matter are 
not of assistance in the acquisition of sense knowledge. 
Further, they have borne witness to Aristotle's and St.Thomas' 
dictum that the soul has not just any kind of a body but one 
aptly disposed for the soul. Correctly interpreted, they have
** St.Thomas Aquinas, op.cit., bk.II, ch, 68. 
56
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made clearer both the immateriality and materiality of sense
knowledge. The Immateriality of sense knowledge, and hence
of the sensitive soul, lies in the fact that such a knowledge
consists in the reception of the sensible species of the known
57without its matter. On the other hand, such knowledge is 
material as it is not had except through corporeal organs.
All impulses arising from stimulation are transmitted
SS
to the specific areas of the brain. This organ seems to be
the corporeal organ of the sensu* commupjs. integrating the
separate sensations into a meaningful whole. It has been 
found that the human cortex is much more perfectly developed 
than that of brutes. There is a reason for this* the human
smnsua communis must be properly disposed to formulate a
phantasm which can serve as the sensuous basis of intellectual 
knowledge. For it is the human soul which, in addition to 
vegetative and sensitive powers in common with the lower forms 
of life, "has an activity that goes entirely beyond matter and 
does not take place through a corporeal organ; namely under­
standing. And because the actual being of a thing is pro­
portioned to its activity, as has been said, since each thing 
acts according as it is being (ens), it must be the case that
57 St.Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotells Libros de Sensu et
âemAato.. de M#mo.r.im.._et._Ê@miniscemtia. Cemmentarium ( Taurini *
Marietti, 1897), lu. I .de. Sensu, leo. 2, no. 20. Cf. Ip 
ArlstotelisLibrum de Anima Cemmentarium. ed, cit.. bk. II, 
lec. 5, no. 248; bk.III, leo. 13, nos. 787-788.
58 £f. Karl U. Smith and William M. Smith, The Behavior
of Man. An introduction to Psychology (Hew York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1958), p. 98.
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the actual being of the human soul surpasses the corporeal
Co
matter and is not totally embraced by it."
By its external powers, the human soul, through the 
corporeal receptor organs impinged on by an object, can dis­
engage the form from the matter of that object. Its inter-
60
nal sense power, the sensus communia. discriminates between
these particular resultants at the same time as it unites
them into perpetual wholes called perceptions.
The sensus communis receives its object in a nobler
way than the external sense power "because it lies at the
very root of sensitivity, where this power has its point of
61
greatest union"; hence, we say that it has a greater immat­
eriality for it collects data not from the external sensibles, 
but from the external senses themselves.
But the human soul possesses another more immaterial 
power which does not require the presence of an object actu­
ally touching on a receptor as the external senses and sensus
pommunis do, but which can, though dependent on previous
62sensation, recall things that are no longer present to the
St.Thomas Aquinas, De. S.oiritualibus Creaturi.s. ed.cit..
ch. 2, p. 36.
60 St.Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotells Librum de Anima
)arium. .ed.., cit... pp. 369-374* (In III de Anima, lec.3,
4* Aià', p. 373. (In III de Anima, lac. 3, no. 612 ).
62
Ibid.. pp. 369-374 (In...Ill, de Anima. lec. 6, no. 659).
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63
outer senses, namely the imagining power, which is found in
man and in some irrational animals, and only indeterminately in
the lower rational a n i m a l s . xt is a more perfect cognitive i
Instrument than the sensus communis as it does not require the
presence of an object for its function, and is in this respect
like the power of reason; hence St.Thomas describes it as a
65
permanent principle of knowledge.
Still more noble is the soul's power of memory by which it
66
can recall past apprehensions; because of this greater nobil­
ity, it is found only in the more perfect animals. For in 
animals the principle of memory is merely the experience of
biological values, that is,of the usefulness or harmfulness of
67
certain things, while in man it is won only with difficulty 
and, like the imaginai power, benefits from its association 
with the intellect.
The human soul, like the animal soul, has the benefit of 
the concupiscible and Irascible appetites, but which differ in 
man by reason of the appetite's being moved by the particular
Ibid.. p. 383. ( In. .11.1 ...cle,. Anima. lec. 4, no. 633).
Ibid.. p. 390. (In III de Anima, lec. 5, no. 644);64
p. 480. (In ill d o Anima, lec. 16. no. 839).
Ibid.. p. 497. (In III de Anima, lec. 18, no. 873).
66
St. Thomas Aquinas, In I de Sensu, ed. cit.. lec. 1, 
no. 12. in I de Memoria et Reminiscentia. ed. cit.. lec. 1, 
no. 309.
67
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. ed. cit.. part I, 
q. 78, a. 74, passim.
68 St. Thomas Aquinas, In I de Memoria et Reminiscentia. 
ed. cit.. lec. 8, nos. 399-400.
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reason (cogitative power) which In turn is guided by the uni­
versal reason. Further, these appetites are subservient to
69
the will.
Over and above these powers of perceiving, imagining 
and remembering, the soul also possesses the power by which 
it can discern the useful and the obnoxious character of 
certain objects. In its purely sensitive state, as in the 
irrational animals, this is known as the estimative power; in 
man, because of its link with the intellect, it takes on 
something of a rational nature and so St,Thomas calls it
70
cogitative power or particular reason. Whereas "in brute 
animals... the estimative power, or instinct, is a sort of 
natural prudence...in man the estimative sense is called the 
cogitative power. It apprehends the individual objects as 
the real and concrete subjects of the universal essence con­
ceived by the intellect. For that reason, and because it can 
conjure these individual intentions, it is called particular
71
reason." "When the object is present, the intellect will
abstract directly from the phantasm of the common sense. If 
it is absent, the imagination will furnish the phantasm. The
6o St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa. fheologiae. ed. cit.. part I,
q, 81, a. 3,
70 St.Thomas Aquinas, In Arlstotelis Librum de Anima 
gomment,arium. ed, cit. « pp. 257-258. (In II de Aniwia'. leo. 13. 
nos. 395 - 396)1
Henri Renard, The Philosophy of Man (Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1948), pp.llO, 111, ( St.Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa, Theoloaiae. ed..,., .cAt.. part I, q. 78, a. 4. )
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cogitative power is constantly used in dealing with knowledge 
of individuals and is a sort of prolongation of the intellect, 
so that in man there is frequent interaction between these 
faculties,
From these phantasms, formed through those corporeal
powers of the soul, it can now, by its highest power which has
no corporeal organ, abstract the intelligible species or essence
of that object which has first stimulated the external sense
power. Because of its ability to grasp the essence of the thing
through a universal, immaterial concept in the act of knowing,
through a power not rooted in any corporeal organ, the soul
itself must be immaterial and transcending the capacity of all
corporeal matter. The soul is consequently "said to be on the
horison and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, in
that it is an incorporeal substance and yet the form of the 
71body" having "operations and powers in common with the body; 
such, for example, are the powers of the nutritive and sentient
part."?4
Like all immaterial substances, as St.Thomas says, the
75
soul is endowed with will.
There is in all things an appetite for the good which
ibid., p' 114.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit.. 
bk. II, ch. 68.
74 St.Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum de Anima. ed.cjt.. ch, 2
p. 25.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra. Gentiles. ed.cit.. 
bk. II, ch. 47.
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is sought by the action of the agent. Now the actions of 
natural things, devoid of knowledge and in which this desire 
is called a 'natural appetite*, follow not on their own forms 
but from forms outside themselves. As we have mentioned 
above, the movements of plants, though the principle of their 
movement is intrinsic, follow on those things of nature which 
nourish them (sun, earth, water) and by which they are genera­
ted (bees. Insects and wind). Brute animals, though they move 
themselves in the sense that one part of them moves another, 
are actually moved by the forms of things sensed and imagined 
upon which appetition follows, through their senses and from 
the judgement of their natural estimative faculty.
However, the forms understood, through which the 
intellectual substance acts, proceed from the intellect itself; 
hence the operation is in the power of the intellectual sub­
stance which is itself productive of the form on which the 
action follows. In that the intellectual substance has mastery 
of its own action, it follows that it is endowed with will. 
Since, through its intellectual cognition, it judges of things 
to be done, and since it has mastery of its own action as we
have just shown, the intellectual substance has freedom of
76choice in action*
77Freedom of choice and will constitute one power, 
which is immaterial, because the will is not subject to any
ibid., ch. 48
77 St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologlae. <ad.,. cit.. part I,
Q,* -Si» 3 y  8 a 4 »
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particular good but has a capacity for the universal and 
78
perfect good. Hence both intellect and will enjoy the 
Immateriality of the universal object which debars the medium 
of a corporeal organ.
However, the intellect holds supremacy and nobility 
over the will absolutely speaking, since the intellect's 
object is the more simple and more abstract idea of the 
appotibl© good which is the will's object. Since the proper 
nature of a power is proportionate to Its object, and the 
object of the intellect is nobler and higher in itself by 
reason of its simplicity and greater degree of abstraction, 
the Intellectual power must be higher and more noble than that 
of the will.
On the other hand, relatively speaking, the will is 
sometimes higher than the intellect for the following reason. 
The end of the intellectual operation is the possible intel­
lect's union with the actually intelligible species at which 
time knowledge is had. Hence St.Thomas says that the action 
of the intellect consists in that the idea of the thing under­
stood is in the one who understands. To employ an often-used 
expression, the thing understood has intentional being in the 
knower. The act of the will consists in that the will is 
inclined to the thing itself, not as having intentional being, 
but as existing in itself. Hence when the soul wills, or is 
inclined to, a good more noble than the soul, in which is the 
idea understood, "by comparison with such a thing, the will is
78 a, 2 Ad 2.
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higher than the i n t e l l e c t B u t  when the good is less noble 
than the soul, the intellect holds supremacy.
In keeping with this doctrine, in this life, the love 
of God, Who is more noble than the soul, is better than the 
knowledge of God, but knowledge of corporeal things is greater 
than the love of them. However, in the case of the Beatific 
Vision, where we have God's own knowledge of Himself, the 
Intellect is more noble, Therefore, man's ultimate end lies, 
not in the love of God, but in the knowledge of God.
From these powers of intellect and will, it is seen 
that the human soul, though a form united to the body, is not 
embraced completely by the body as though immersed in it as
A A
other material forms are, but transcends the capacity of the
whole of corporeal matter, the potentiality for intelligibles
exists in the soul and this (potentiality) belongs to the
possible intellect. Certainly the soul, so far as it is united
to the body, has operations and powers in common with the body;
81
such, for example, are the powers of the sentient part. Thus 
does the soul transfuse the body. It still remains that the
79 Ibid.. a. 3, a. 4î St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra, Gen^ 
tiles. 9.^1* cit.. bk. Ill, ch.2b.
80 This is one of the few places in which St.Thomas refers 
to the human soul as a 'material' form. It is 'material' in so 
far as it is a form of matter and therefore in matter, but not 
as being submerged in matter.
81 St.Thomas Aquinas, Qpusculum de Anima, translated by
John Patrick Rowan: The Soul (St.Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 
ch. 2, pp. 25 * 26.
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possible intellect is separate, not in the sense of existing 
apart from man, but as being free from matter in its operation, 
being not a power rooted in a bodily organ. Since this infin­
ite power is not placed in a magnitude but is rooted in the 
intellectual substance, we have no cause for concern at
Averroes' objection that an infinite power cannot be placed in 
82
a finite body. Man is said to understand formally by means 
of the intellect Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of 
his soul. That "the possible intellect is a certain power or 
faculty of the human soul" and not a separate substance, is 
evident from the fact that understanding is not had without 
the corporeal phantasms, which situation we have discussed 
above#
Since a perfect proportion is not required and the
soul is not immersed in matter, and since the intellect is not
the act of any part of the body, it follows that its receptive -
ness is not that of prime matter, for Intellectual receptive-
mess and operation are altogether without a corporeal organ.
On first realising this capacity to possess all other
being, one is apt to succumb to a kind of spiritual snobbery
in which the body is seen as a hindrance, a prison of the soul,
or at best "a mere tool to be tossed aside when its edge is 
§4blunted," To do so is to lose sight of the very nature of




Walter Farrell, O.P., Mv Wav of Life, the Summa (Summa 
yhe.olo.giae of St,Thomas Aquinas) simplified. (Pocket ed. 
Brooklyn: Confraternity of the Precious Blood, 1952), p. 94.
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the soul and consequently the nature of man. For the soul 
needs the sense-receptors, the twelve billion neurones, the 
wonderful complexity of the nerve tracts, and the brain of 
the body for the production of the phantasms from which it may 
abstract the intelligible species. Hence, the body is not 
merely a tool nor a clumsy impediment to the soul's powers; it 
has a certain nobility in that, aptly disposed, it co-operates 
in the acquisition of truth with the soul by which it is trans­
fused and thus given nobility.
In speaking of the human soul's need of the body,
Etienne Gilson says "the cause of such a need is a certain
8S
incompleteness in actuality." He goes on to explain that
the soul does not need to be confirmed in its own nature:
As has been said several times, there is no form of 
the form nor any act of the form qua form, but it 
still needs to become more fully that which it is....
Always in existential potency to the absolute full­
ness of its own being, such a form is bound to exert 
manifold operations in order to fill the privation 
of actuality which it suffers: not a privation of 
essence but that of substance which still fails com­
pletely 'to be' its own essence, and which in order 
more fully to be must achieve its own being by 
exciting a series of operations, each of which shall 
ultimately bring it a step nearer to its own com­
pletion. B6
In erery created being there is an "incompleteness 
in actuality" for in God alone is Hi® essence His "to be."
All creatures exercise their act of existing only by reason 
of the Pure Act and hence in a limited way "being always in
s ^ Gilson, OP, cit.. p. 180,
Ibid.. p. 181.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
existential potency". In them there must always be a composi­
tion of act and the principle of limitation, potency, 'esse* 
and 'quod est', since ease cannot be the source of its own 
limitation as, if it were, an effect would pre-exist the cause. 
Nor are these, 'esse' and * quod est'. to be taken as two exist­
ing things, for 'esse' is  not a thing, not an essence, nor has 
an essence any reality without 'esse*. Rather, they are two 
metaphysical constituents, two real principles, which combined 
produce a third, namely the composite which we call 'ens*.
Now a spiritual substance is the composite of 'esse*
(quo est) and 'forma' (quod est). In them the form or intellec­
tual substance is the very essence. However, that composite 
being, man, is  still further removed from the First Principle 
and in him there is  an even greater limitation or incomplete­
ness in actuality. For in man there is a two-fold composition,
'esse'(act) and 'essentia* (quod est - potency), the latter
being a unity produced by the composition of the two metaphysi-
87s a l c onetituent s » forma * (act) and 'materia* (potency).
Already enjoying its own act of existence as an actually 
existing substance, the human form, the soul, can have no 
further act, as such would result in an accidental being; as
an already existing form, it can have no other form, as such 
would entail a regression to infinity. Hence it does not and 
cannot "need to be confirmed in its own nature." But it is
87 St.Thomas Aquinas, Be Ente et Essentia, translated by 
Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B.; On Being and Essence (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), ch. 4 .
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am intellectual substance which is on the confines of spiritual
88and corporeal creatures, the powers of which meet in the soul*
The soul is a substance which is not the total essence
of man. In  order to exercise its intellectual powers, the soul
must first exercise its vegetative powers to preserve the body
which it meeds. I t  must exercise i t s  sensitive powers that the
body may perform those acts of sensation which result in the
production of the phantasm. Only then can the soul exercise its
intellectual powers, rendering actually intelligible the form or
species so that the form or species may be one with the possible
intellect. Finally in order that the thing be known, the
essence bad in th is  simple apprehension must then be restored
by the soul's judgement to its own act of existing, for it is
the composite union of esse and essence which constitutes the
actually e x is tin g  th in g . Thus the soul, in exercising this
series  of powers and operations, may attain to a knowledge of
the created th ings of the universe, and may proceed by reason
to a certain analogical and mediate knowledge of the Cause of 
$o
these e ffe c ts .
It is only after its separation from the body that the 
soul may ultimately rejoice in the repose of that immediate
90
intellectual violon, through the aid of the Divine illumination,
O0
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. sâ«£i=â* > part i, 
q. 77, *. 2o.
^9 Ibid.. q. 12, a. 12 c.
90 Ibid.. a. 5,
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of that Cause, the Source of all truth, which vision consti­
tutes his felicity; only then can the soul embrace in the
ecstasy of the fullest love of which the will is capable, the
91
Source of all good so presented to it by the intellect. Nor 
is the soul's enjoyment of this happiness to be marred by a 
futile inclination to be united to the body, for this futility 
is dissolved in the resurrection of the glorified body, and its 
reunion with the soul. As it im the whole man who exercises 
the earthly mode of existence, so it is the whole man who exer­
cises the heavenly mode of existence.
In the unity of the one act of being, proper to the 
soul and communicated to the body by the soul, surpassing the 
corporeal world by h is  intellectual power which can have no 
corporeal organ, man subsists and tends by his manifold powers 
and operations toward that repose in the understanding of Divine 
Truth which is his final end and, achieved, the full perfection 
of his being. Man is not a rational animal. He is an intel­
lectual being whose existence is the working out of an intel­
lectual soul, which, in itself transcending matter, achieves 
rationality in the ordered union with matter, to work through 
rationality to the intellectuality of the final vision of 
Truth Itself.
9^ St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit.. 
bk. Ill, ch. 25.
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APPENDIX
Besides the works already mentioned, there are 
several relatively recent arguments pertinent to the topic 
of this thesis, and dealing  with some of the more urgent 
difficulties involved in its implications and ramifications. 
In particular, there have come to the writer’s attention four 
articles appearing in the New Scholasticism, which is pub- 
quarterly by the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
In one of these. The Raison D’Btre of the Human 
Composite. According to St.Thomas Aquinas.^  John D. MoKian 
discusses the reason for man's existence in terms of the in­
trinsic ratio of the hierarchy of being, which God has insti-
2
tuted for His own purposes. His approach is much the same 
as that of St.Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, in 
that he begins at the Summit of the hierarchy - God, Pure 
Esse, the Transcendent Source o f this hierarchy of being.
After estab lish in g  that God is  pure existence, and 
hence pure goodness, and noting that "since every agent oper­
ate» in order to produce what 1» like to itself, then the
^ John D. McKian, "The Raison D'Etre of the Human Compo­
site, According to bt.Thomas Aquinas", The New Scholasticism. 
XVIII (1944), 42 - 75.
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perfection of any effect will consist precisely in some 
likeness to the agent upon which it depends for the existence 
it receives",^ he notes that the Thomist may find in the 
order of God’s creation, a sense in which this order may be 
said to require the presence of man, an effect which attains 
its perfection by"returning to i t s  cause"^ in its operations 
of understanding and willing. Man's presence may be said to 
be required in that "a break or a gap between the spiritual 
and corporeal orders of creation would be repugnant to such 
an orderly graduation"^ - the graduation of being arranged by 
the Master Architect in a hierarchy according to their de­
grees of participation in His own perfection. "In having to 
look to sensible things for all his knowledge, man necessarily 
affords those things the opportunity of making their due con­
tribution to the formal extrinsic glory of God. In this way,
the concert of creatures giving praise to their maker is com- 
6
pleted."
The article is closed in giving consideration to an 
appreciation of the nature of man's intellectual passivity 
which explains the fact th a t the human spirit must exist 
united with a body, which we have just seen explained in terms
3 Ibid., p. 45.
4 Ib id . .  p. 60.
 ^Ibid.. p. 63. 
6 Ibid., p. 64.
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of the finality of creation in general.
Passivity, he notes, can have no place in the Absolute
Simplicity of Divinity. Being nearer to Divinity, the angelic
separate substances are always in actual possession of the
intelligible species connatural to them. "In contrast, the
human intellect is the lowest member of the intellectual hier- 
7archy", furthest removed from the Pure Act of the First
Intellect, and consequently in a greater state of potentiality
or passivity. Unlike the angelic separate substance, the
human intellect is, at conception, devoid of intelligible 
8forms, and must look to sensible things for these intelli­
gible forms which it receives from sensible things but not in 
a totally passive way. For, by its exercise of the matter 
immersed external and internal sense powers, the soul provides 
itself with a phantasm from which it may abstract the intelli­
gible species by the illuminating light of the agent intellect. 
Since the human intellect is in such a state of passivity, and 
must look to the lower order of sensible things, it is only 
fitting that the human principle of intellection should exist 
as the form of the body.
Further considerations on the union of soul and body, 
be found in Rev. John F« McCormick's The Durden of the
7 Ibid.. p. 67. 
9 p' 13.
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9
Body wherein he discusses the Thomistic answer to the question 
of whether charity can be had in its perfection in this life.^^ 
The problem arises because St.Thomas assigns as one reason why 
the soul cannot rise to the vision of the Divine Light in its
essence, that the body is a burden to the soul. Fr. McCormick
pursues the matter to point out that St.Thomas is referring to
the body as a burden not by reason of the necessary care of the
body, nor by reason of the soul's preoccupation with temporal 
things for the sake of the body, nor does it seem to have refer­
ence to sin, but rather by reason of the body's corruptibility 
which keeps the soul from r is in g  to the vision of the Divine 
Light in i t s  essence, of which impediment man cannot rid him­
self in this present life, Fr. McCormick goes on to point out, 
with reference to several passages, that St.Thomas is insistent 
that the union of the human soul with the body is not disadvan­
tageous to the soul. Rather, the union is natural to the soul 
both because of the argument from the completion of the species^ 
and the argument of the soul's need in knowing, to turn to
12
phantasms which cannot be had except by means of the body.
9 John F. McCormick, "The Burden of the Body", The New 
Sc..hol.a.st.ici.«. XII (1938), 392 - 400.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae. IV, "De Veri- 
tate" (London, I9OO), q. 2, a. 10.
m o ra . p, 33.
Supra. pp. 33 - 34.
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At the close of the a r t ic le ,  FrwMcCoriaick speaks of
the intellectual light as being Immaterial (so too is the
in t e l l ig ib le  o b jec t) -  the need for freedom from matter on
the side o f the knower and the known. He goes on to note that
"nearness to matter is  a dim inishing of light in the intellect
11and in the intelligible form ", and that consequently "the 
intellectual l ig h t  poured into a soul united w ith  a body is
14
dimmed by the material body to which the soul is conjoined."
He continues, "therefore  to the fe e b le r l ig h t  of his intellect 
there corresponds fo r  man the shaded i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  of the
"15forms of m ateria l th in g s , h is proportioned objects of thought.
Therefore , it is n atu ra l fo r  man's soul to have an asoectum ad
inferiora. and so the body, rather than being an impediment is
an Indispensable aid  to mental growth.
It is to be noted that both these a r t ic le s  closed with
references to the agent intellect. In  connection with the
agent in t e l le c t ,  Fr. McCormick brings up a perplexing problem
in another article, ûuaestiones Disputandae. That problem
17is discussed in  Anton C. Fegis ' In Umbra Intelligentiae 
13 guora. p. 30; McCormick, op-cit.. p. 400.
IbifL. 
IS Ibid.
John F, McCormick, "Quaestiones Disputandae", The New 
S.cholastic.ism. XIII, (1939), 368 - 374.
^7 Anton C. Pegis, "In Umbra Intelligentiae", The New 
Scholasticism. XIV (1940), 146 - 180.
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whereisi he states it am being the difficulty in seeing*
(a) how the soul can have a way of operating, and 
therefore of being, when separated from the body, 
and (b) how, even in the body, the agent intellect 
can have a function which is not entirely limited 
to illumining the phantasms in the imagination. 18
In other words, after death's separation of soul and
body, does the agent intellect cease to have any utility in
the separated soul, "i.e., at precisely the time when the
reason for its existence and the condition of its activity no
longer exist."^9 A# Pr.McCormick pointed out, St.Thomas'
texts seem to indicate that the agent intellect has but the one
function of illuminating the phantasm, and would then seem to
have no utility in the separated soul. Dr. Pegis notes that
"the Aristotelianism which St.Thomas made the historical
20
cornerstone of his own thought" has led us into this trap.
While falling back on Plato would help in finding a solution,
that avenue is closed to us, since Plato's efficient causality
21
of the mover-moved relationship is untenable.
Dr. Pegis goes on to show that the soul must be form 
as well as substance. Furthermore, the union of soul and body 
must be a natural one, a naturalness which is discovered in 
the nature and articulation of human knowledge itself. Therein
Ibid.. p. 147.
19 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. ISO.
££* âBBEâ, P- 27.
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we discover the "humbleness" of the origin of human knowledge 
and the imperfection of the agent from which it proceeds.
Dr. Pegis continues in stating that perhaps the 
answer to the problem at hand will be resolved in a considera­
tion of the significance and the consequences, as well as the 
metaphysical origins; of St.Thomas' tests "Ratiocinatur homo 
discurrendo e t inquirendo lumine rational! per continuum et 
tempus obumbrato, ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu et imagine 
s c c ip i t . . . " * *
He goes on to note that man is situated in nobility, 
in the hierarchy of being, above the brute animal but also 
below the angel, As such, man has a lesser degree of intel­
lectuality than the angel, varying by reason of the lesser 
universality of the p rin c ip le  o f knowledge and hence his in­
tellect requires a knowledge of "the natures of singulars 
through singular species", Giving closer consideration to  the 
d iffe re n c e s , he notes*
(a) the soul is  made for union with the body, the angel 
not; (b) the soul is rational, the angel is Intellect;
(e) the angel has an intellect that is receptive only 
of what is  above it, receiving illumination from above, 
whether from God or from another angel, while the human 
soul has an intellect that is  receptive of both what is 
above it and below it, for the human soul is illumined 
and also receives knowledge from phantasms; (d) the 
angel has an immutable vertibility, because it clings 
immutably to the good or the e v i l  to which it has once
22 Pegis, OP. cit., p. 157» S t .Thomas Aquinas, "In I I  
Sententiarum Petri Lombardi", Ooera Omnia (New York, 1948), 
d.III, Q.l, a .2, - in the la t t e r  work we find intellectuali 
instead of ratlonali.
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turned through its own election, while man has a mutable 
vertibility, because he can go from good to evil, and 
the reverse} (e) the angel expresses himself through 
certain intellectual signs without the vehicle of 
physical sound, while man speaks through the expression 
of sound. 23
Dr. Pegis places great stress on the fact of the soul's 
imperfection as an intellectual substance, the reason for 
f in d in g  within the soul's essence infra-intellectual powers. On 
a subsequent page, "intellectual light belongs to the soul by 
the very fact that it p a rtic ip a te s  in an intellectual nature 
To see these differences "is to see, in a way, the relation of 
the light of the agent in te l le c t  towards intelligere and 
abstrahere. " Note the assignation of two functions to the 
agent intellect - the abstraction of the intelligible species 
and the illumination of the intelligible species abstracted.
The light of man's agent Intellect is not sufficient
26
for a distinct knowledge of th ings. The intellectual light 
which exists in man for knowing (intelligere), and in which 
the soul shares, is a diminished light; it suffers from a 
d e b il i ta s , a weakness whereby it does not actually contain the 
determ inations of the th ings known by man who, being intellec­
tually without actual specification, must turn to the realm of
23
Pegis, on. cit.. pp. 161 - 162; Af. St.Thomas Aquinas, 
UR,bit. (In IISententiarum), d.III, q.l, a.6.
24 Pegis, op.cit.. p. 164.
Ibid.
2^ St.Thomas Aquinas, on.cit. (In II Sententiarum).
d . I I I ,  q.3, a.3, ad.l, and a.4.
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material substances - hence the need for abstraction 
(abstrahere),
The writer confesses that Dr. Pegis’ conclusion is 
rather vague. However, i t  would seem that he does conclude 
th a t the agent in te l le c t  has a function of Illumination over 
and above the function of ab straction . In closing, Dr.Pegis 
sta tes  th a t "the intellectual light ex is ts  by nature as the
27means of knowing whether in God or in the angel or in man." 
This statement would seem to leave very little doubt that 
Dr. Pegis does reach th is  conclusion, for he would scarcely 
assign to God’ s or the angel’ s intellect the function of 
abstraction.
It is the w r i te r ’ s opinion that the agent intellect
in  the separated soul can have the utility of illumination
though not o f ab strac tio n . In  support of this conclusion,
the following passage is offered:
. . .o p era tic  intellectu® agentis e t possibilis reepieit 
phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita; sed 
cum e r i t  anima a corpore separata, per intellectum 
possibilim recipiet species effluentes a substantife 
superioribus, et per intellectum agentem habebit 
virtutem ad intelligendum. 28
27 Pegis, jU LuJèü', P" 180.
28 St.Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae. II, "Do 
Anima" (London, 1897), IS, ad 9.
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